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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE UNLICENSED
PRACTICE OF LAW AS REPRESENTED BY
DRAFTING OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
During the past several years, encroachments by notaries public,
realtors, trust and title companies, and banks and others into fields
of activity which the legal profession consider to be practice of
law, and from which the Bar feel protection of the public requires
exclusion of laymen, have reached such proportions as to create a
problem calling for careful consideration by the American Bar
Association and the various state and local bar associations. The
field into which these encroachments have been most general is
that of preparing legal instruments, particularly wills, trust agree-
ments, deeds, mortgages, and contracts. To curb such activity,
there has been of late no small amount of litigation in many states
wherein the unlicensed practice of law as represented in the draft-
mg of legal instruments has been prosecuted under crininal
statutes, or the offenders cited for contempt or restrained by equity
from further practice. In several states statutes have been enacted
defining the drawing of legal documents as practice of law.'
In view of the activity along this line in other states, the interest-
mg Washington case of PauZ v. Stanley,2 is of particular note.
Plaintiffs, attorneys, for themselves and the other attorneys in the
county, brought a bill in equity to enjom defendant, a notary public
and realtor, from the unlicensed practice of law. Defendant had
drawn all types of documents, legal and otherwise, simple and com-
plex, from filling in blanks on printed forms to complete drafting
of entire instruments, and charged for such work, he gave advice
as to the nature, effect, and procedure i filing and service, of legal
instruments, both in connection with the drafting thereof and other-
2See note 10, zmfra.2 168 Wash. 371, 12 Pac. (2nd) 401 (1932).
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wise, making no charge, however, for advice alone. He advertised
that he drew legal documents. He declared his intention to con-
tinue to draw legal documents.
The decree, as amended by the Washington court, provided
S in particular it is further ordered, adjudged
and decreed that defendant be and hereby is enjoined
from preparing papers, pleadings and documents for
others connected with proceedings pending or prospective
before a justice court or superior court of this state, from
advising and counselling persons as to their legal rights,
whether in connection with the drawing of legal instru-
ments, documents and papers relating to the legal rights
of persons or otherwise, from preparing or drawing for
others, for reward, present or prospective, deeds, mort-
gages, leases, agreements, contracts, bills of sale, chattel
mortgages, wills, notes, conditional sales contracts relat-
ing to either real or personal property, options, powers of
attorney, community property agreements, liens, bonds,
mortgage assignments, mortgage releases, chattel mortgage
satisfactions, creditors' claims in probate, notice to vacate
premises, notices to quit or pay rent, vendors' statements
of creditors under bulk sales law, articles of incorporation,
and any other documents requiring the use of knowledge
of law in their preparation."
Stanley, the defendant, was a notary public, and his defense
was based in part on the fact that notaries customarily draw all
manner of legal instruments. That notaries public under the old
Common Law had, and under current practice on the Continent
have, the right to draw such instruments is granted,3 but it must
be remembered that under both these systems of law notaries were
and are particularly trained and bound by the tenets of their own
organizations. Under the present Civil Law, notaries are officers
of the court. Under modern practice in this country, notaries
public do not by virtue of their office have the right to draw legal
instruments.4
The right to engage in the practice of law is not an inherent
right vested in every citizen of the United States, but is one sub-
ject to control and limitation by the states. The right of an at-
torney to practice law is a franchise from the state,5 and is a prop-
erty right,6 which as property will be protected by equity, even
3See the article by Hicks and Katz, "The Practice of Law by Laymen
and Lay Agencies, 41 Yale L. Jour. at pages 78 and 94.
4 People v. Title Guarantee & Trust C&., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. 1D. 666
(1919) see People v. Alfan, 227 N. Y. 334, 335, 336, 125 N. E. 671, 673,
674 (1919).
5In re Ellis, 118 Wash. 484, 203 Pac. 957 (1922) In re Bailey, 146 Pac.
1101 (Mont. 1915) In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15,
32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 55 (1910) see State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants'
Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 662 (1919).
*State ex rel. Rhode v. Sachs, 2 Wash. 373, 26 Pac. 865, 26 Am. St.
Rep. 857 (1891) In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 72 Pac. 710 (1903) Gootman
v. Western Bank & Trust Co., 28 Ohio N. P N. S. 272, 3 Ohio Bar Assn.
Rep. 609 (1931).
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though the act which invades it is at the same time a violation of
a criminal statute.7
Statutes maing it unlawful for unlicensed persons and for
corporations to practice law are general, but rarely define the term
"practice of law,8 definition being left for the courts, which have
by no means been uniform in definig the term.
It is clear that practice of law is not limited in definition to
practice before the courts ;9 indeed, perhaps the most lucrative work
of the profession is the so-called "office practice." Granted that
drafting of legal instruments is a regular part of the work of an
attorney, is the doing of such work to be included within the term
"practice of law" or the term "do work of a legal nature" under
statutes forbidding laymen from engaging in the practice of law?
In other words. is the drafting of legal instrulnents a right ex-
clusive to the legal profession9 If so, should distinction be made
between simple and complex instruments9
Spealng generally, preparation of legal instruments is practice
of law and forbidden to the layman, (it being understood, of course,
of authority and the newer legislation uphold this proposition. 0
that a person can draw papers for his own use) The great weight
7 Goodman v. Western. Bank & Trust Co., supra, Dworken v. Depart-
ment House Owners Assn., 38 Ohio C. A. 265, 176 N. E. 577 (1931). The
Ohio court in the Goodman case said: "Admission of an. attorney to prac-
tice law confers upon him a right in the nature of a franchise or property
right to engage in his profession without competition of others who are
not officers of the court or subject to its discipline or orders and
such attorney is entitled to the same protection as the owner of any
other franchise or property right. Injunction may issue despite the fact
the act was also a crime."
8Wash. Rem. Comp. Stat. (Ann.) (1922), P. C. 156 et seq. provides:
"No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counsellor at
law or to do work of a legal nature for compensation, or to represent
himself as an attorney or counsellor at law or qualified to do work of
a legal nature, unless he is a citizen of the United States and a bona fide
resident of this state and has been admitted to practice law in this state;"
etc.
'Savings Bank 1). Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621 (1879) Boykins
v. Hopkins, 162 S. E. 796 (Ga. 1932) People v. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931) A. Meisel & Co. v. National Jew-
elers Board of Trade, 90 N. Y. Misc. 19, 152 N. Y. S. 913 (1915) State V.
Bryan, 98. N. C. 644, 4 S. E. 522 (1887) In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 65
S. E. 210, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750, 18 Ann. Cas. 757 (1909). Contra in
Georgia and Kentucky under particular state statutes, Atlanta Title &
Trust Co. v. Boykrn, 172 Ga. 437, 157 S. E. 455 (1931), a case involving
practice of law by a corporation, and Cun7ap v. Lebrus, 112 Ky. 237, 65
S. W. 441 (1901).
1In re Pace, 170 App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. S. 641 (1915) People v.
Alfans, note 4, supra; see Bley v. Miller 7 Ind. App. 529, 535, 34 N. E. 836,
837 (1893). The newer legislation specifically so provides; Ala. Ann. Code
(1928) sec. 6248-b., " advises or counsels another as to secular law,
or draws or procures or assists in the drawing of a paper, document or
instrument affecting or relating to secular rights." Miss. Code (1930), Sec.
3710, prohibits laymen from drawing any bill of sale, deed of conveyance,
deed of trust, mortgage, contract or will, subject to certain exceptions.
Mo. Rev. Stats. (1929) ch. 78, sec. 11692, is of particular interest because
it clearly separates court and office practice, defining the latter in part
as "drawing of a paper, document or instrument affecting or relating to
secular rights." Notice also Ore. Code Ann. (1930) see. 100. Minn. Laws
of 1931, chap. 114, sec. C, while forbidding drawing of some types of legal
instruments by others than attorneys, excepts from the statute certain
simple instruments.
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But as to whether "legal instruments" is a term irnluding all of
those instruments affecting rights and liabilities, used in ordinary
business transactions, there apparently was no clear and positive
holding in the United States prior to Paul v. Stanley to the effect
that all such instruments are legal instruments, that no differen-
tiation shall be made between simple and complex instruments, or
between preparation of instruments in their entirety and mere
filling in of blanks on printed forms. In so holding, the Wash-
ington court has gone beyond the prior decisions. In People v.
Title Guarantee & Trust Co.," Hiscock, C. J., speaking of simple
instruments, said
"We may take judicial notice of a widespread custom,
which has prevailed from time out of memory in this state,
and, doing so, we know that laymen have been accustomed
to draw such instruments, not merely as a matter of ac-
commodation for friends and neighbors, but for pay "
In a recent Idaho case,12 after holding drawing of wills and trust
agreements to be practice of law, the court went on to say
"Such work as the mere filling out of skeleton blanks
or drawing instruments of generally recognized stereo-
type form, effectuating the conveyance or encumbrance of
property such as a simple deed or mortgage, not involving
the determination of the legal effect of special facts and
conditions, is generally regarded as the legitimate right
of any layman."
The Washington court in Paul v. Stanley quoted with approval the
statement of Judge Pound in a concurring opinion in People v.
Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,'5
"I am unable to rest any satisfactory test on the dis-
tinction between simple and complex instruments. The
most complex are simple to the skilled and the simplest
often trouble the inexperienced."
Use of printed forms of mortgages, deeds, bills of sale, and
such is widespread. Although they apparently require only filling
in of the blanks from known facts and hence apparently little or
no legal knowledge, it is submitted that they are properly included
as legal instruments. Any variance from an orthodox set-up m
the facts may require a clear understanding of the legal problems
involved in order to secure to the client the rights he desires or
to protect him against uncontemplated obligations. Indeed, a
comprehensive knowledge of law may be required to detect such
variance. 4
What is the effect of advice as to the nature of the instrument,
given in connection with the drafting9 In Paul v. Stanley, the
Washington court first pointed out that giving of legal advice in
- 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919).
1In re Eastern Tdaho Loan & Trust Co., 288 Pac. 157 (1930)
13Note 11, supra.
"In A. Metsel & Co. v. National Jewelers Board of Trade, note 9, supra,
the court, in referring to a printed claim in bankruptcy, stated that it was
a legal instrument and retained that character, although printed and
capable of completion by filling up the blanks.
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connection with instruments drawn was, in fact, doing work of a
legal nature, and then stated that in view of the proof that de-
fendant gave legal ad-nce with the instruments he drew, the trial
court erred in not enjoining him from drawing simple instru-
ments. This coupling of advice with the drafting of simple instru-
ments weakens the decree, it indicates that the drafting of such
instruments would not be practice of law in the absence of legal
advice given with them. That the giving of legal advice is itself
practice of law seems settled.15 It is submitted that in absence
of express advice to the client as to the legal nature and effect of
the instrument, the scrivener of even the simplest form of legal
instrument in drafting and tendering to Ins client such an instru-
ment implies that it is suitable for his requirements and that no
other form of instrument would be as good. Rarely does the client
know precisely the type and form of instrument he needs, he
knows the results he wishes to secure, and from the facts the
scrivener proceeds to prepare what he considers the suitable instru-
ment. The implication of advice in fact is surely strong where
express advice is not given.
Is remuneration essential to make the drafting of legal instru-
ments by a layman unlawful practice of law9 In the matter of
remuneration, the Washington court followed many other juris-
dictions,16 stating that the law does not purpose to protect those
persons who pay nothing for the service received, and enjoining
defendant from drawing legal instruments for "reward, present
or prospective." The holding is based on Washington Rem. Comp.
Stats. Ann. (1922), sec. 139-4, which statute may, for convenience
in considering it, be divided as follows No person shall (1) prac-
tice as an attorney or counsellor at law, (2) do work of a legal
nature for compensation, (3) represent himself as qualified to do
work of a legal nature, (4) represent himself as an attorney or
counsellor at law. It will be noted that this is, in effect, a penal
statute, being followed by sec. 139-22 declaring the unlicensed
practice of law a gross misdemeanor. The court, following sub-
section (2) above, held the drafting of legal instruments to be
doing work of a legal nature and insisted on the requirement of
compensation, refusing to adhere to plaintiffs' contention that the
drawing of legal instruments being practice of law, and the statute
m question being penal, the court should proceed in this equitable
's Boykrns v. Hopkzns, note 9, supra, Barr v. Cardell, 173 Iowa 18, 155
N. W. 312 (1915) People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, note 9, supra,
Eley v. Miller, note 10, supra; People v. Alfan, note 4, supra, In re
Dunca., note 9, supra.
" In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., note 12, supra, and the stat-
utes indicated in note 10. The Alabama statute is representative, stating,
"For a consideration, reward or pecuniary benefit, present or anticipated,
direct or indirect, " However, the New York court in People v. Peo-
ple's Trust Co., 180 N. Y. App. Div. 494, 26 N. Y. Grim. Rep. 203, 167 N. Y.
S. 767 (1917) held guilty a defendant who had employed an attorney
to draw a will for its client, defendant paying the attorney itself and
receiving no remuneration from the client save the expectation of future
executor's fees under the will. It was shown that defendant solicited
trust business by supplying wills to clients free of charge, provided the
company was named executor, defendant maintaining a connection with
licensed attorneys whom it paid to draw the wills.
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action on the broader basis of the inherent power in the court to
govern and limit the practice of law irrespective of statute."7
Plaintiffs contended that under such power, and for public pro-
tection, it should be held practice of law to draw legal instruments
with or without remuneration, and that a contrary holding would
open the doors for endless imposition on the public and the legal
fraternity by free preparation of legal instruments by laymen,
such as notaries and realtors and lay agencies such as banks and
trust and title companies under the heading "accommodation,"
such agencies in fact deriving from such activities a definite re-
turn in the form of good will and enhanced business in other lines.
It will be interesting to note whether, in future cases, the Wash-
ington court construes such return as "reward, present or future."
In summary, Paul v. Stanley establishes in this state the right
of an attorney to injunctive relief against the unlicensed practice
of law as represented by the drafting of legal instruments, simple
or complex, and even where blanks are filled in on a printed form
of legal instrument, provided advice be given in connection with
the drafting of simple instruments, and provided remuneration be
received by the draftsman.
Protection of both Bar and public requires a clear statute, or
court interpretation, defining "practice of law," that all may know
exactly what activities are forbidden to laymen and lay agencies
under Wash. Rem. Comp. Stats. Ann. (1922) see. 139-4. The
instant case is an advance toward that clear definition.18
WARREN L. SHATTUCK.
"In re Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405 (1888) In re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918) State ex rel. Dysart v.
Cameron, 140 Wash. 101, 248 Pac. 408, 54 A. L. R. 311 (1926) People v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, note 9, supra, In re Opznwn,of the
Justices, 180 N. E. 725 (Mass. 1932) State v. Cannon, 196 Wisc. 45, 221
N. W 603 (1928) In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924).
18Along the same general line, and presenting a holding on another
phase of unlicensed practice of law, is the decision of Judge McFarlane
of the Superior Court of King County, handed down Nov. 10, 1932, in the
action of Howard Adams et al. v. T R. Mulligan et al. Plaintiffs, who
were attorneys, sought to enjoin defendants from the unlicensed practice
of law, and the decree was granted. Defendants called themselves "ad-
justers" and were engaged in soliciting personal injury and other tort
claims, which they would proceed to settle, either directly with the other
party or by litigation, where the matter went to trial, defendants re-
tained attorneys to represent their client. They also prepared releases
and advised their clients of their legal rights in respect to the injuries
sustained by them. Judge McFarlane said: "I believe that whether work
is or is not of a legal nature is to be determined by whether or not the
work requires any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Although all busi-
ness men necessarily use some degree of legal knowledge in their own
business, the question of law arises only if some one, not licensed, is
hired to draw those contracts by which rights are defined, set forth, lim-
ited, terminated, specified, claimed, or granted." Judge McFarlane went
on to say that no matter what defendants called themselves, their activi-
ties amounted to practice of law and were enjoinable when pursued by
other than duly licensed attorneys.
